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INDORSEMENT AFTER MATURITY AND THE 
"NEW BILL" DOCTRINE 
by 
JOSEPH M. CORMACKt and BRUCE BROWNE2 
Abstracted from 30 ILLINOis LAw REVIEW 46, MAY 1935 
Should subsequent presentment 
for payment and notice of dis· 
honor be required in order to 
charge one who indorses a nego· 
tiable instrument after maturity? 
It will be assumed that the instru· 
ment by its terms is a time and 
not a demand instrument, and 
that the indorsement is by the one 
holding the instrument at maturity. 
When a negotiable instrument 
is indorsed after maturity, there is 
an assignment of the chose in ac• 
tion possessed by the one holding 
the instrument when it became 
due. It has been felt that under 
such circumstances the bill or note 
should continue to be governed by 
the principles relating to negotiable 
paper. Such is the view of the 
N. I. L., which provides, in Sec• 
tion 4 7, that an instrument nego· 
tiable in its origin continues to be 
such until discharged or restric· 
tively indorsed; and, in Section 7, 
that an instrument issued, accepted, 
or indorsed when overdue is pay· 
able on demand. 
In general the position that 
negotiability continues after ma· 
turity is undoubtedly sound. If the 
requirement of subsequent present· 
ment and notice, however, is to be 
made, it is an apt illustration of 
a "trap for the unwary". Nor• 
mally these steps are taken at ma• 
turity. As to parties already upon 
the instrument, such action can 
have no effect if taken later. It is 
altogether unlikely that a taker 
after maturity will have the knowl· 
edge, or that it will occur to him, 
that there is a possibility of pro• 
ducing any legal effect as to any 
person through such action at a 
later date. 
In striving to overcome the ob-
stacles felt to lie in the way of 
actions by indorsees of bills and 
notes, it was reasoned that every 
indorsement is "as a new bill", and 
that, therefore, the indorsee should 
be permitted to proceed upon it. 
Some felt that the indorser after 
maturity had assured the indorsee 
that the money was still to be had 
upon demand, notwithstanding the 
inferences to be drawn from pas• 
sage of the time originally set for 
payment. Stoc1(man v. Riley, 13 
S. C. Law 398, 399 (1823). 
Others stated that the require• 
ment of presentment and notice 
was justified upon the ground that, 
as the instrument was already over• 
due when negotiated, the indorse• 
ment amounted to an authority to 
endeavor to collect through the use 
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of reasonable diligence. Gra.y v. 
Bell. 31 S.C. 67, 44 Am. Dec. 277 
(1845), (second appeal) 37 S. C. 
Law 71 (1846). 
Only at the original date of a 
negotiable instrument, however, 
should presentment and notice be 
required. As to any later neces• 
sity for such action, resort should 
be had to the maxim commencing 
"When the reason for the rule 
ceases". In view of the want of 
any sufficient reason for requiring 
in his behalf subsequent present• 
ment and notice, the position of 
the indorser after maturity should 
be the same as that of an indorser 
whose liability has been fixed by 
such action taken at maturity. As 
to the indorser after maturity, as 
in connection with proceedings 
against secondary parties generally, 
no steps to collect first from the 
primary party should be required. 
In future legislation the require• 
ment of presentment for payment 
and notice of dishonor in order to 
charge an indorser after maturity 
should be eliminated. 
